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ter does not and cannot define the concept of justice, any settlement of a dispute or adjustment of an-
other situation, recommended by the General Assembly or the Security Council is in conformity with
the postulate in question. For the organ which makes the recommendation will certainly not admit that its
decision is not in conformity with justice if it is not in conformity with positive law; and it is upon the organ
to decide this question. The effect of the formula ' in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law ' is to leave the settlement of disputes and the adjustment of other situations to the discretion of the Organ-
isation.

The function of the Organisation to bring about settlement of disputes and the obligation of the Members to
settle their disputes are to a great extent in such close correlation that it is difficult to understand why the
former shall be ' in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,' whereas the latter shall
not be performed in exactly the same way, but ' in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered.'

The demand not to endanger justice in settling a dispute is directed at the Members of the United Nations, the
latter being obliged to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The peaceful means to settle a dispute are:
agreement of the parties brought about either directly by negotiation or mediation, or indirectly by accepting
the recommendation of a conciliation commission; or by submitting the dispute to the decision of an interna-
tional tribunal. If the dispute is settled directly by agreement between the parties, the requirement of
justice seems to be of no use at all. For in this case, justice can mean only what the parties consider to be just;
and if they voluntarily reach an agreement with respect to the settlement it may be supposed that they both
consider the settlement to be just. To question the justice of an agreement entered into by the parties concerned
is certainly not proper; but it is not excluded, at least according to the wording of Article 2, paragraph 3. After
having entered into the agreement, one party may try to contest its validity under Article 2, paragraph
3, by maintaining that it endangers justice. This is certainly not in conformity with the principle of ' respect
for the obligations arising from treaties ' proclaimed in the Preamble.

Under Article 33, paragraph 1, the parties may submit the dispute to a conciliation commission or to an inter-
national tribunal. What effect has the provision of Article 2, paragraph 3, obliging the Members not to endanger
justice in settling their disputes, in this respect? Are the parties obliged to bind, in the instrument establishing
the conciliation commission or the tribunal, the authority thus established to apply principles of justice not
rules of existing international law, if they are in conflict with the former? It does not seem that this is the
intention of Article 2, paragraph 3. If so, what is the use of obliging the Members not to endanger justice in
settling their disputes? May a party refuse to comply with the recommendation of a conciliation commis-
sion or the decision of an international tribunal on the ground that the recommendation or the decision
endangers justice? This is possible with respect to the recommendation of a conciliation commission, even
without the provision of Article 2, paragraph 3, that the settlement of a dispute shall not endanger justice. Not
to comply with the decision of the tribunal is a violation of the obligation assumed by the parties in the treaty
by which the dispute has been submitted to the decision of the tribunal.

Under Article 33, paragraph 1, the parties may submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Article
36, paragraph 3, even provides ' that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the
International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.' The Statute, as
pointed out, does not authorise the Court to decide disputes according to principles of justice. Under Article
38, the Court is bound ' to decide in accordance with international law.' Only if the parties agree thereto, the
Court may decide the dispute ex aequo et bono, which is not identical with ' principles of justice.' May a party
refuse to comply with a decision of the Court on the ground that the decision endangers justice, because
Article 2, paragraph 3, obliges the Members not to endanger justice in settling their disputes? If Article
2, paragraph 3, should be interpreted in this way, it would be in open conflict with the obligation of the Member
laid down in Article 94, paragraph 1, of the Charter, ' to comply with the decision of the International Court of
Justice in any case to which it is a party.'

Under Article 37, paragraph 2, the Security Council, and, under Article 10 or Article 11, paragraph 2, the
General Assembly may make recommendations for the settlement of a dispute. Referring to its obligation
under Article 2, paragraph 3, a party may refuse to comply with the recommendation on the ground that